supranationalism. First, we argue that, in addition to supranationalism, at least two other modes of international governance exist: hierarchy, in which states transfer regulatory authority to dominant states for certain limited purposes, and networks, in which states, private actors, or both share regulatory authority through coordinated and repeated interaction. Hierarchies and networks serve as functional substitutes for supranational delegation to international institutions.
In a second stage of our explanation, political models of international governance are deployed as substitutes for or supplements to economic models of governance, which predict too much supranationalism and cannot explain when and why one or another of these modes of governance occurs. Economic models are largely functionalist in their logic, predicting choice of the most efficient governance structure.
Such explanations are unreliable when alternative modes of governance are available.
Efficiency is often overwhelmed as a driver in the presence of distributional and institutional conflict, which often characterizes regulatory policies. We have sketched such an alternative political model in earlier work; here we develop a positive argument in favor of political explanations for the apparent "missing" supranationalism and offer preliminary conjectures on the politics of choice among alternative governance models.
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Globalization and Supranationalism: Unexplained Variation
In contrast to the first era of globalization (before 1914) and the interwar decades of economic turbulence and closure, planning for international economic governance after World War II awarded a far more central role to intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) than had been the case under the League of Nations. The turn toward formal IGOs, however, was not a result of increased economic integration: those institutions, whatever their liberalizing goals, were designed during World War II and its aftermath, a low point in international economic integration. As global economic integration 1 See Lake 2003a, 2003b. increased, particularly after 1980, its effects on these institutions of supranational delegation was far from uniform. One favored prediction had been that such integration, if it did not induce a nationalist backlash, would require substantial increases in the authority of supranational institutions. Although economic integration proceeded at a different pace according to region and issue-area, its advance in key areas of trade, finance, and foreign direct investment could not be questioned. Yet institutional outcomes at the global level were hardly uniform. Globalization produced a marked increase in supranational delegation in the trade regime, a decline in supranationalism in the monetary and financial regimes, and a complete failure to delegate in the rules governing foreign direct investment.
The trade regime has most closely followed the predicted path of increasing authority delegated to global and regional IGOs. The scope of the World Trade Organization (WTO), founded in 1995, was larger than its predecessor, the GATT, encompassing trade in services, as well as behind-the-border policies that had previously been labeled "domestic," or at least outside the scrutiny of intergovernmental institutions. In particular, regulatory domains, such as intellectual property, health and safety regulations, and technical standards were all brought under the scrutiny of the new organization. For the first time, regulatory policies were brought within the trade regime in their own right and not "as an adjunct to a larger concern about border trade issues."
2 Competition policy, rules on foreign investment, and labor and environmental standards were promoted as new (and traditionally domestic) spheres for future negotiation; they were already included in regional trade agreements. In each of these cases, new domestic actors were mobilized, distinct from the old exporter and importcompeting constituencies, and the trade regime integrated new principles and norms to govern these issues. 3 The new authority of the WTO was reflected in a more efficient Dispute Settlement Understanding that reduced the power of national governments to deflect and delay panel reports and in an Appellate Body that could engage in judicial lawmaking. 4 In the oversight of national financial, monetary, and exchange rate policieswhere global economic integration has progressed farther than it has in trade in goods If supranational delegation has increased in the trade regime and declined in the monetary and financial domain, the international rules governing foreign direct 3 Barton et al. 2006, 94-98, 125-151. 4 Ibid., 75-87. 5 The (GATS). The degree to which regulatory authority over foreign direct investment has migrated to the global level and has been delegated to IGOs is minimal, however. This leaves the network of BITs as the primary governance structure in this issue-area.
Alternative Modes of Global Governance
This marked variation in supranational governance-variation that could be demonstrated in regulatory regimes as well--is explained in part by the existence of 6 Vandevelde 1998 , 628. 7 Golub 2003 . If the subordinate retains these residual rights of control, the relationship between dominant and subordinate state is more anarchic, and if the dominant state acquires these rights, the relationship is more hierarchic.
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In international relations, authority and, in turn, hierarchy rests not on a formallegal foundation but on an exchange relationship in which the dominant state provides a social order or public goods of value to the subordinates, and subordinates in turn recognize an obligation to comply with rules or resource claims that are necessary for the production of that social order or public goods. In this way, hierarchy forms an equilibrium that is regarded by both sides to the exchange as legitimate or appropriate.
For this equilibrium to endure, both the dominant and subordinate states must hold to their sides of the implicit contract -the dominant state must provide the social order or public goods, the subordinates must comply with its legitimate commands. The key contracting difficulty under hierarchy is restraining opportunistic behavior by the dominant state. Having yielded authority, subordinates correctly fear that the dominant state will exploit them or seek to renegotiate the contract in its favor at some future date.
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Perhaps the best illustration of hierarchy in the contemporary international economy is dollarization, the hardest of exchange rate pegs, in which one country 10 Podolny and Page 1998, 59. 17 Walter Powell and others also add a distinctive ethic or norm that governs network relations, particularly the norm of reciprocity and the consequent accretion of trust among its members. (Powell 1990, 304-305) 18 Keck and Sikkink 1998 . See also Kahler 2006 , Lake and Wong 2006 , and EilstrupSangiovanni 2006 . 19 Slaughter 2004, 36-64; Raustiala 2002. many purely informational networks do not exercise authority because national governments resist sharing that authority (and adjusting their regulatory regimes).
These three stylized modes of global governance permit many hybrid forms. 
Explaining Global Governance
Identifying possible alternatives to supranationalism does not explain why these alternatives are sometimes selected. The existence of alternatives is a necessary condition for unraveling the mystery of the missing supranationalism, but it is not alone sufficient. The expectation that supranational governance would replace national governance follows from a reliance on economic models of global governance. These models, we argue, need to be replaced by political models that focus on the preferences of actors and the institutions that condition their behavior and choice of governance structures.
Economic Models of Global Governance
Economic explanations of global governance largely focus on the migration of authority from the national to the supranational level and are essentially functionalist, explaining the choice of institution on efficiency grounds. Economic explanations hinge on three variables: externalities or spillovers, economies of scale in the production of public goods, and the heterogeneity or homogeneity of national preferences.
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Externalities are key to the shift of governance upward in regulatory regimes, as the increased mobility of economic agents threatens to undermine national regulatory policies. The responses of national authorities in turn produce regulatory changes that have their own spillovers in other national jurisdictions. Although it is certainly reasonable to assume that national regulatory policies produce more externalities than they did under conditions of lower economic integration, the scope of the externalities must be examined in each sector.
Economies of scale in the production of public goods may also create demand for greater supranational authority. Economic models assume a drive for more efficient outcomes over time: public goods production will take place at its most efficient site. The evidence for such a bias is thin, however, at both the international and national level.
(Consider the production of different public goods in a federal system such as the United
States.) More significant in considering the migration of regulatory authority from the national to supranational level is possible conflict between externalities and efficient scale in producing the public good of regulation. In many regulatory domains, globalization produces growing cross-border externalities, but the most efficient site for regulation remains national jurisdictions. Supranational regulatory cooperation must then center on the effective coordination and mobilization of national regulatory authorities for cooperative ends rather than the creation of a new supranational regulatory authority.
Tugging against the pressures of externalities and economies of scale in economic models are heterogeneous national preferences over the public goods that might be produced cooperatively at a supranational level. The intuition here is that smaller units of governance (national rather than supranational) will be more likely to produce policies that are closer to the preferences of their citizens. 22 In the case of regulatory policies, greater diversity of preferences within and among national electorates is likely to arrest the movement of authority to higher (regional or global) levels. Such preferences are not exogenous to globalization itself, however, and a key issue, one that pervades the debate over "national capitalisms" and their persistence, is whether economic integration produces more heterogeneity in preferences (particularly between the winners and losers from economic integration) or greater homogeneity through processes of diffusion and competition.
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22 Tiebout 1956; Alesina and Spolaore 2003. 23 In their description of a key frontier of regulatory oversight, corporate governance, Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) , for example, argue that national divergence persists in the face of increased capital and corporate mobility.
Economic explanations of international hierarchy or network forms of governance are less well developed. Indeed, supranationalism has been the focus of research in this area, with the European Union being the motivating example, and other governance structures have largely been ignored. As largely functionalist or efficiency-based explanations of governance change, in turn, economic models are not well adapted to explain choices across alternative forms of international governance. Nonetheless, economic explanations of hierarchy would include, in addition to the variables explaining supranationalism above, a focus on levels of asset specificity. Drawing on relational contracting theories of the firm, economic theories would predict that hierarchy is most likely to emerge when there are large gains from successful cooperation but states are asymmetrically dependent on assets specific to particular dyadic relationships.
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Economic explanations of networks emphasize personal, cultural, or institutional ties between actors that facilitate through reciprocity the making of credible commitments over time and space. 25 Neither of these augmented economic explanations, however, seeks to explain the choice of governance structure from among the array of alternatives.
Political models of global governance: democracies and supranationalism
A first political explanation attributes the rise of supranationalism indirectly to the parallel growth of democracy. This explanation is largely silent on the choice among supranationalism, hierarchy, and networks. The supposed affinity between democracies and delegation to IGOs rests on one empirical finding and one significant historical case.
The first is the well-documented relationship between democracies and IGO membership; the second is the experience of Europe, a homogeneously democratic 24 Frieden 1994 , Lake 1999 , Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1992 . In cases of symmetrical dependence or "mutual hostages," no formal governance structure may be needed (states revert to the default structure of national sovereignty). 25 Greif 2006, Rauch and Casella 2001. region that has produced a degree of supranational delegation unmatched in any other part of the world. Since World War I, democracies have demonstrated a greater likelihood to join IGOs than non-democratic regimes. This result is particularly strong for the industrialized democracies. 26 Mansfield and Pevehouse have argued that democratizing regimes exhibit their own distinctive predisposition for IGO membership.
Their core argument hinges on the additional credibility that international organizations, particularly those dominated by other democratic states, add to the policy commitments of new democracies.
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The clear bias among democracies for IGO membership is easily, perhaps too easily, equated to a predisposition on the part of democracies for supranationalism.
Three empirical findings undermine an easy equation of democracy and supranational delegation. First, joining existing IGOs may not mean support for greater delegation of authority to IGOs. In the universe of international agreements, substantial delegation of authority to IGOs is relatively rare: fully 55% of a sample of such agreements lacked any dispute settlement mechanism, even an informal one among the parties to the agreement. 28 Existing research on the democratic bias toward membership does not discriminate between IGOs with greater or less delegated authority.
A second, stylized regional fact also undermines claims that democracies support supranationalism. Although one region that is homogenously democratic, Europe, has produced the greatest affinity for regional organization and delegation by its members to those organizations, two other regions that approach democratic homogeneity, North and South America, demonstrate little appetite for enhanced supranational delegation in key regional economic agreements. Although membership in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is now fully democratic, calls for 26 Shanks et al. 1996 , Minnich 2005 , results are summarized in Rey and Barkdull 2005. 27 Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006a. 28 Koremenos 2005, 17-18. "deepening" the agreement have met with political inaction. MERCOSUR, a customs union joining Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, has also retained essentially the same array of institutions that existed at its creation. Further supranational delegation has been deterred by economic turmoil in Argentina and by the prospective widening of MERCOSUR to include Venezuela.
Finally, the record of democratic compliance with international commitments also calls into question a simple relationship between regime type and supranationalism. In their critical examination of the fashionable concept of ownership, Bird and Willett note the conflicting findings on democracies and implementation of IMF programs. Although political economy variables often seem to be significant predictors of implementation, investigators have found negative, neutral, and positive effects for democracy. 29 Simmons discovers a similar pattern in her analysis of national commitments to avoid restrictions on payments and transfers for current account transactions (Article IV of the Articles of Agreement). Democracy has no effect on a country's adoption of the commitment or on its compliance with those commitments. Rule-of-law states, on the other hand, are significantly more likely to comply with these commitments.
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Although this evidence is far from conclusive, there are a number of reasons to predict that the relationship between democracy and supranational delegation may be weak or even negative. Returning to the economic models for both migration of authority and delegation to IGOs, heterogeneity of interests was predicted to be a significant determinant of supranationalism. If globalization produces political salient cleavages between winners and losers within countries and those cleavages are expressed in politics, then supranationalism may be less likely. Democracy is more likely to permit the 29 Bird and Willett 2004, 439-440 . 30 Simmons 2000, 832. Xinyuan Dai has recently summarized these and other conflicting findings that link democratic regimes to both greater compliance and non-compliance. (Dai, (1) (2) expression of those divisions than authoritarian regimes; the effects of democracy, as the economic models predict, may be a bias toward retaining authority at lower (national and subnational) levels, a reinforcement of smaller rather than larger units of authority.
Michael Tomz has examined this effect in the case of Argentina, where sharp political divides over policy changes demanded by IMF conditionality and debt repayment produced a breakdown in compliance with international commitments. As Tomz describes, the conventional wisdom associating democracy with compliance depends three assumptions: "voters know where they stand on the question of compliance, regard it as important enough to sway their vote, and prefer compliance to default. 
Political models of global governance: conflict, preferences, and institutions
Economic models offer some leverage over trends in the site of international economic and regulatory governance over time. Democratic institutions do not provide an adequate political alternative for specifying when and why the choice is made among supranational, hierarchical, and network modes of governance. A generalized political model is more promising as an explanation for both the migration of governance sites and the choice among alternative modes of governance.
Such political explanations begin with the premise that the choice of governance structure is the pursuit of politics by other means. That is, actors have no intrinsic preference for one or another governance structure per se, but struggle to influence the 34 Keck and Sikkink 1998 , Florini 2003 , Slaughter 2004 . 35 Slaughter 2004, chapter 6. choice of structure so as to maximize their political aims. Since different governance structures favor different policies and political outcomes, actors-including states -with stakes in these alternatives will attempt to influence the selection. The conflict over governance is largely a conflict over policy, once removed.
Political explanations focus on two sets of variables -preferences and institutions -to explain which governance structure is ultimately selected. Elsewhere, we have developed a set of insights based on a political model for the choice of supranationalism. 36 In this section, we pose a set of conjectures using variations in preferences and institutions to explain the choice between supranational, hierarchic, and network forms of governance. These conjectures are quite tentative and are intended only to structure and simulate further discussion and research.
Preferences
Nearly all policies, and especially regulatory policies, favor some groups or countries over others. There are few "neutral" policies that make everyone better off while making no one worse off. Free trade raises national welfare, but favors exporters over import-competing industries and abundant over scarce factors of production.
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Industry regulation that limits competition creates rents for producers at the expense of consumers, 38 while environmental regulations raise costs to producers and possibly current consumers (through higher prices) but benefit future generations. Industry standards are among those issues with the fewest distributional implications, yet even here any standard is likely to favor the producers and countries that use that standard and harm those who must convert to it. and especially those for whom the costs of the policy are widely dispersed, will suffer from more acute collective action problems. A smaller number of winners who enjoy more concentrated benefits will have greater incentives to organize and lobby states for preferred policies -and especially the ability to set those policies themselves.
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Concentrated interests with similar preferences can coordination effectively through networks. Although they may still require the power of states to impose those policies on the broader group of losers, the winners will seek to maximize their autonomy and control within networks they dominate. 
National institutions and the move to international governance
Institutional characteristics and mode of governance
Modes of international governance-supranationalism, networks, and hierarchies-display certain institutional characteristics that may be favored or opposed by particular interests. In this regard, modes of governance differ in at least two ways:
the credibility that they add to policies and their policymaking decisiveness.
When faced with a time-inconsistency problem or the threat of an exogenous shift in preferences, groups may attempt to lock in or pre-commit to a particular policy.
Countries that lack domestic institutions to make commitments credible will borrow credibility by transferring authority to another state or to a supranational organization.
(C8) In the monetary arena, for example, states can gain credibility by fixing their exchange rates or "dollarizing," both of which create a measure of hierarchy by transferring effective control over monetary policy to the target state. States may also seek credibility by creating a regional monetary system, such as the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Perhaps because policies are emergent properties produced by the actions of the parties themselves, networks appear to confer little credibility. 47 Alter 1998.
Although both hierarchies and supranational institutions can confer credibility, the choice between the two modes is conditioned by a second credibility dilemma. Dominant countries in hierarchical relationships face a key problem: How do they commit to a particular policy and, as noted above, how do they commit not to exploit the authority they acquire over subordinate states? Countries will only fix their exchange rates to the dollar or use it as their primary medium of exchange if they are confident that the dollar is stable in value and can be exchanged for goods and services elsewhere. In turn, they must also be confident that, having fixed to the dollar or dollarized, the United States will not use the leverage it acquires over them to demand additional policy changes or concessions. This is the classic problem of tying the sovereign's hands. 
Power distribution and mode of governance
Although asymmetries in power would appear to predict hierarchical governance and certainly most hierarchies are to be found in such circumstances. A more refined political analysis, foreshadowed above, suggests that powerful states might well choose any of these governance alternatives, depending on the context. Hierarchy serves to curb opportunistic behavior, but only with increased governance costs (the dominant power bears all of those costs in contrast to more distributed costs of supranationalism or networked cooperation). Supranationalism presents potential agency costs, but those 50 European discontent with its hierarchical security relationship with the United States has usually increased in line with greater U. S. global activism and policy volatility. 51 Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2006.
may be offset by a major power's independent sources of information (curbing one potential advantage of an IGO agent) and by decision rules that award a dominant role in decision-making to the major power. Finally, networked organization may appear the least attractive to a major power, but the powerful may exercise disproportionate influence in the network, depending on its structure, and national power may be more easily and usefully disguised in a networked structure.
Each of these conjectures, based on a generalized political model of governance, requires systematic investigation across regulatory regimes. The variety of governance modes that can be found in international financial regulation makes that issue-area an ideal site for an initial, if hardly conclusive, survey.
Financial Regulation and the Varieties of Global Governance
International finance has been the leading edge of globalization in recent States in that instance asserted its ability to exclude products (tuna caught in ways that killed dolphins) from its market that did not meet the requirements of domestic environmental legislation (in this case, the Marine Mammals Protection Act). The GATT panel found against the United States-and created uproar among environmentalistsby determining that the United States was effectively using market access to extend the reach of its environmental regulations. As the panel argued: "if the United States can 58 Slaughter and Zaring 1997. 59 Putnam 2005, 30. dictate conservation measures to Mexico as a condition to Mexico's access to the United States market, the GATT will be eviscerated."
The United States is not alone in wielding market access for regulatory ends. The
European Union has undertaken similar steps to end the culling of baby seals in Canada and to force a ban on leghold traps among fur suppliers outside Europe. 60 Regulatory hierarchy achieved through implicit or explicit sanctions or incentives has been part of the European Union's expansion to the south and east. In negotiations with prospective member states, the acquis communautaire, the entire body of legislation of the European Communities and Union, must be accepted before new members can join the European Union. Judith Kelley has described the use of membership conditionality to influence politically sensitive legislation affecting the treatment of ethnic minorities.
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Other international institutions have used prospective membership in the same fashion, to shape domestic regulation and legislation in directions desired by the existing membership of the organization.
How can regulatory hierarchy be distinguished from emulation based on diffusion, learning, or competition? First, the emulation is consistently in one direction:
regulatory adoption is not a process of consensus building by both parties. There may also be little evidence of genuine consultation or negotiation (apart from the timing of the regulatory changes). An implicit or explicit threat of sanctions exists if regulatory harmonization does not take place; positive incentives and technical assistance may also be part of the hierarchical relationship. Finally, one-way emulation is sustained over time: if regulatory rules change in the dominant party, they are highly likely to change in the emulating state as well. In the case of collective membership organizations, of course, hierarchy ends when membership occurs: the new member will have some role, 60 For a description of trade measures taken in pursuit of regulatory ends, see Vogel 1995, 98-149 . 61 Kelley 2004. however small, in shaping new decisions on regulatory changes from within the organization.
Hierarchical regulatory harmonization is not always contrary to the interests of the party that adopts the regulations in questions. The costs to national autonomy may seem high, but, as in the case of dollarization, the adoption of an external regulatory standard may serve long-run economic interests or create a more credible regulatory regime. On the other hand, in addition to autonomy costs, unnecessary harmonization may be imposed in the interests of economic actors resident in the dominant countries.
A careful examination of each alternative and the counterfactual outcome (in the absence of hierarchy) is required to assess the effects of regulatory hierarchy.
The United States has used "emulation or else" and extraterritoriality in recent efforts to extend its regulatory reach across national borders. Efforts to control money laundering in other financial jurisdictions were an early and important feature of the U. S.
war on drugs. Using the Kerry Amendment to the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, the United
States government could wield access to U.S. financial markets, including the allimportant clearing systems, as a threat to enforce its regulatory preferences. This initial use of hierarchy later led to a club-like and networked arrangement among those regulators who came to share U.S. preferences.
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In a more recent instance, the United States was able to use a similar threat to reduce financial transfers to the newly elected Hamas government, after its electoral The European Central Bank disclaimed SWIFT's actions as beyond its regulatory competence. 66 SWIFT was caught between two regulatory regimes, one American, emphasizing counter-terrorism, and one European, focused on individual privacy. In this case, however, American assertion of hierarchy was challenged (after its discovery).
In a final case, that of the "NatWest three," three British bankers were extradited to the United States for financial fraud as part of the Enron scandal. Although the suspects are British and the "crime," if there was one, occurred entirely in Britain, the three will be tried in the United States because the main evidence is in Houston and the alleged fraud, it is maintained, could not have occurred without the complicity of Enron executives. The three executives were seized under a treaty of expedited extradition that These cases highlight several of the conjectures developed above. First, in all three instances, the distributional consequences of the issue are large but not so large as to scuttle agreement completely. In each instance, the United States benefits from the exercise of its authority and its ability to impose its preferred outcome on other states.
But at the same time, this authority is wielded in pursuit of larger public goods, specifically anti-drug trafficking, counter-terrorism, and deterring corporate fraud.
Certainly in the cases of the PA and SWIFT, the United States had especially strong preferences, but its disproportionate gains from imposing its preferred polices on others were tempered by broader benefits.
Second, the United States benefited from its traditional position as the country responsible for managing the international financial system, a role that other countries have accepted and, indeed, consented to through decades of past practice. The United
States possesses a measure of legitimacy in regulating international financial transactions that it does not enjoy in other issue-areas. This authority, in turn, rests on the crucial role of American capital markets and American finance in the global economy, and its generally (but not always) reliable stewardship of international financial markets.
67 "Unintended consequences" and "America's long shadow," The Economist, July 15, 2006, pp.12 and 56-57. Third, in the PA and SWIFT cases, at least, the United States possessed a measure of extraordinary legitimacy generated by 9/11 and the salience of counterterrorism. Even though the war in Iraq has generated considerable opposition and undermined American authority, the United States still benefits from considerable sympathy from other countries from the attacks on 9/11. Since it was able to connect both the opposition to Hamas and the extraordinary access to the SWIFT records to counter-terrorism, it benefited from the acquiescence if not active support of other countries.
Finally, in each case, as expected, the key issue that generates controversy is how to ensure that the United States does not abuse its position of authority by destroying the PA, by extending its monitoring of international financial transactions to the selective control of those transactions, or by the unjust extradition of foreign citizens.
The credibility problem is how to constrain the United States. The difficulty of solving this problem that has rendered these cases controversial. In truly hierarchic relations with settled conceptions of authority, the rights exercised by the dominant state would not be contested and probably would not generate much press attention. That these cases came to light and generated controversy, even if direct opposition from other countries is relatively muted, suggests that in each case the United States is testing the limits of what other states will accept.
Regulatory networks: harmonization behind closed doors
Network regulation is also difficult to identify within the contemporary international economy. Network regulation is defined by frequent reciprocal interactions between connected parties. By its nature, network regulation may be observationally equivalent to multiple unilateral actions by concerned states. There is no central authority to command the individual nodes, and each may simply adopt current "best practice" in any given issue area. What characterizes networked governance is not so much the outcome but the process by which shared policies are adopted. States are not driven to a common policy by competitive constraints or some hegemonic set of ideas.
Rather, network nodes develop a pattern of cooperation based on trust embedded within deep reciprocal ties. 68 In international finance, the cooperation of central bank and related monetary authorities that has proven central to international stability over the last decades provides good evidence of a regulatory network "at work."
Central bank cooperation and the public-private network that sustained it date to the first era of globalization before 1914 and deepened during the 1920s. concerned less with the level of capital they must maintain and more with leveling the playing field on which they must compete. Although each state (and its associated banking interests) might prefer looser regulations for itself to gain a competitive 78 Simmons 2001. 79 Kapstein 1991, 21; Kapstein 1994, 103-128 . 80 Helleiner 2002 makes this comparison. 81 Ibid., 188.
advantage, the G-10 countries at the heart of the BIS system all have large domestic financial markets and appropriate concerns over stability. Together, these states also recognize the potentially disastrous consequences of a race to the bottom in banking regulation. Private markets in many cases reinforce the upward regulatory pressure:
major banks wish to be seen as regulated by market participants. More a problem of coordination than collaboration, the actors within the network primarily need to establish a focal point on bank capitalization, a mechanism for periodic monitoring of national practice, and a network is sufficient for these purposes.
Second, given the relative autonomy already granted to central banks and other monetary authorities by national governments, a network of like-minded financial actors could be created to exclude other, larger groups (e.g., debtors who favor a higher rate of inflation, financial services institutions that would like to expand into private banking) that suffer from collective action problems and are already prevented by domestic institutions from being veto players in the issue area. Within the restricted group of financial authorities, frequent and collegial interactions could arise that bolster cooperation.
Indeed, although central bank cooperation has received attention as a networked governance structure, 82 it may well approximate a "best case' for the emergence of this particular form not because of any inherent agreement on monetary and financial policies but because opposing interests are either unable to organize effectively or are excluded institutionally from exercising power and influence in this area.
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Finally, once again, given the relative autonomy of central bankers in the G-10, and their existing statutory power to set capital adequacy requirements for banks in their jurisdictions, the financial and monetary authorities within the network did not need to import policy credibility by shifting national authority to a supranational or hierarchical 82 Slaughter 2004. 83 See Gowa 1988 governance structure. Since their own hands were already untied to create monetary and financial credibility at the domestic level (and to tie the hands of domestic politicians who might otherwise undermine confidence in the financial system), no higher authority was necessary, and a network form of governance was favored at the international level.
Conclusion
Attention in the media to successive "crises" in global IGOs-the United Nations, the WTO, and the IMF--may suggest that the fate of global governance hinges on their success. Supranationalism is not the only form of global governance, however, even within a single issue-area like international financial regulation. Throughout the global economy, supranationalism plays a less central role than many believe. In the governance of international finance, including financial regulation, supranationalism did not play a central role after 1945: national governance retained its dominance until the opening of financial markets after 1970s. Even today, it is principally the international coordination of national policies that occurs at the global level. Hierarchies and networks are often effective alternatives to supranationalism, in this case and, we suspect, others. Any explanation of supranationalism, therefore, must also explain why not hierarchy or networks (or hybrid forms).
Economic explanations over-predict supranational governance in the international economy and generally fail to explain the choice across alternative modes of governance. Democracy has expanded dramatically in recent decades, but appears to be weakly associated with supranationalism both theoretically and empirically. Political explanations that emphasize actor preferences and institutions that constrain choice appear to be a more promising avenue towards explaining the variation in global governance. Two tasks remain. Our explanatory conjectures need to be grounded theoretically and tested systematically. And this exercise in explaining the forms of global governance must also contribute to the equally important task of defining which forms are most effective in advancing the competing goals of an increasingly diverse field of international actors.
